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Abstract 
Crisis narratives and populist representations of the woes of Africa abound. Civil society 
organisations do not always help, as their activities continue to sustain a particularly negative 
image of Africa. ‘Revisionists’ have tried to counter this state of affairs by providing ‘success 
stories’ about Africa. Thus, the literature on the state of affairs in Africa is reduced to a 
bifurcation of ‘failure’ and ‘success’ without resolving the fundamental question of whether 
there is something wrong with economic development in Africa. This paper tries to move that 
state of knowledge forward by providing a systematic analysis of what development analysts 
and practitioners mean by ‘economic development’, while exploring how adequate are the 
indices for measuring the idea. Framing the question in those terms reveals a complex 
ensemble of findings among which are the contested nature of economic development, its 
indicators, and predictions – findings which have substantial implications for judging whether 
there is something wrong with economic development in Africa. 
Keywords: Africa, Socio-economic Indicators, Progress, Development 
 
1. Introduction 
Is life in Africa getting better? Or, put in other words, is something wrong 
with economic development in Africa? This question has been asked time and 
again and time and again it has generated polarised responses. For example, The 
Economist (2000) has depicted Africa as a ‘hopeless continent’ where life is 
getting worse, while the African Development Bank (2011) has suggested that 
life is good in Africa, and is even getting better. Indeed, the recent work of Greg 
Mills and Jeffrey Herbst, Africa’s Third Liberation (2012), depicts the enormous 
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economic successes, following two earlier liberations – independence from 
colonisers and liberation from dictators.  
The approach of most existing studies (e.g., Alvarez et al., 2011) is to do 
trends analysis of economic development in Africa using established traditional 
indices such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or employ crisis narratives 
based on prejudices of inherent African cultural primitivity or 
neopatrimonialism (for a critique, see Njoh and Ayuk-Etang, 2012).  Efforts by 
leading African economists such as Augustine Fosu have been rewarding in 
‘getting the numbers right’ and showing that Africa’s GDP performance is not 
that bad after all (Fosu, 2010).  However, these prior efforts are incomplete 
without going beyond and taking both a synchronic and diachronic view of the 
received global wisdom of what development means, how it is measured, and 
how it is lived, why development is pursued, why it is measured in particular 
ways, and why development has evolved to what it is today – matters which lie 
at the heart of the question, whether there is something wrong with economic 
development in Africa (Bierschenk and Spies, 2010).  
Therefore, this article tries to do a systematic analysis of the concept of 
economic development per se and the adequacy of how it is usually measured. 
Framing the question in those terms reveals a complex ensemble of dynamics 
among which is the contested nature of economic development, its indicators, 
and predictions – features which have substantial implications for judging 
whether life is getting better in Africa. An alternative measure that draws 
directly on how people feel in Africa, however, shows that life in Africa is 
mostly good and most of the people in Africa lead a happy and purposeful life.  
The article is divided into three sections, the first of which examines what 
development analysts mean by ‘economic development’, demonstrates the 
fluidity of the concept, and exposes some of the weaknesses in the proxies used 
to measure it. The second section explores the desirability and implications of 
using an important alternative measure of economic development, while the 
final section addresses the research question about whether there is something 
wrong with economic development in Africa. 
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2. Economic Development: 1887 - 2000 
‘Development’ is a concept that is in vogue. It has a global acceptance 
among academics, policy makers, sports people, and entertainers. Part of the 
reason for the popularity of the notion is its association with early philosophers 
(e.g., Aristotle) and religious leaders (e.g., St. Augustine) who commanded 
considerable global respect, but also because it is synonymous with the 
biological metaphor of improving, progressing, or growing and also partly 
because of the backing that the concept gets from powerful political and 
economic institutions which claim that ‘development’ is good for everybody 
(Rist, 2006). It might even be argued that ‘development’ is an integral part of the 
natural process for humanity – a process of advancement or becoming better, 
continuously if possible. Development, then, can be said to be in vogue because 
it is the usual way human beings think about things.  Exploring whether there is 
something nebulous about economic development in Africa is, however, a more 
circuitous matter. It requires a conceptual analysis set within a historical frame 
which entails a reflection on the evolution of the concept of ‘economic 
development’.  
The first time that notion appeared in the English language was in the 
English translation of Marx’ Capital which is widely believed to have borrowed 
the idea from Hegel who had previously got it from Aristotle (Arndt, 1981, 
pp.458-459). Since then, there was the idea of ‘colonial economic development’ 
which, unlike the Marxist notion, meant the exploitation of natural resources in 
the colonies. This duality of meaning – the development of societies and the 
exploitation of natural resources – characterised debates about economic 
development for a long time, until the concept next became popular in the post 
war period when President Truman of the United States alluded to it (Rist, 
2006). From then to now, the meaning of the concept has been fluid, changing 
from one epoch to another.  
Since 1945, economic development has always been regarded as ‘a 
process of change’. However, from the beginning, that change referred only to 
activities by governments to transform the nature of, for example, land tenure. 
After the Second World War (WW2), however, economic development began to 
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be seen as a process of change that societies, as a whole, underwent. Apart from 
a change in the scope of economic development, the political status of the 
concept went through three other changes after the war. First, there was a 
general acceptance that some countries had not experienced economic 
development. Second, it was felt that those countries needed to experience 
economic development and, third, there was a tendency to believe that the 
situation in the latter countries could be helped or worsened by the activities of 
other countries that had experienced economic development (Arndt, 1989, p.9). 
While economic development was considered a process of change that every 
society had to go through, the ends of that change underwent considerable 
transformation.  
In the early days, economic development meant modernisation, 
industrialisation, and even Westernisation (Arndt, 1989, p.2). The end of WW2 
and, the attainment of independence of the former colonies (which began to be 
labelled as ‘Third World’1) raised economic growth to the status of globally 
accepted objective of economic development. Polish economist Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan was a pioneer in theorising about how to expedite economic 
growth. As with Adam Smith, he favoured capital accumulation, especially 
industrialisation as the key objective of economic development. His theory of 
the ‘big push’ – the idea that poorer countries were stuck in a particular state of 
widespread unemployment and underemployment in the agrarian sector and 
required a massive capital injection in their economies to give them a ‘big push’ 
- became highly influential. Estonian economist Ragnar Nurske, who famously 
                                                            
1  This descriptor refers to countries (e.g., the nations of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and 
Latin America) other than those in the ‘first world’ (Western countries and Japan where industrialisation 
first took grounds and civil liberties were first formally upheld) and the ‘second world’ (the Soviet Union 
and former communist countries mainly in Eastern Europe) (Handelman, 2011, pp. 1-2). Development 
scholars and analysts differ in their opinion about the appropriateness of using ‘Third world’ as a 
descriptor. Some analysts prefer to use ‘developing nations’. Dependency theorists use the descriptor 
‘undeveloped’ countries to explain a state of not being modern, while they use ‘underdeveloped countries’ 
to describe the countries that have suffered from colonialism (Frank, 1966).  Critics of the Term, 
‘developing countries’ argue that it connotes a ‘catching up’ idea or a feeling that the conditions in these 
countries are transient or at a certain stage and would change soon. Thus, the international development 
agencies such as the United Nations started to use the term ‘less developed countries’ (Handelman, 2011, 
pp. 1-2). Countries in Africa are, therefore, simultaneously referred to as less developed, Third World, or 
Developing. Descriptors such as ‘emerging market economies’, ‘transition economies’, ‘newly 
industrialized or industrializing countries’, and the ‘Global South’ are also sometimes used to describe 
countries in Africa. 
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said that ‘[countries] are poor because [they] are poor’ – walked closely in 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s steps, although recaliberating his thesis of economic 
development in terms of a vicious cycle which had to be broken (Bauer, 1971, 
pp. 32-33; Martinussen, 2005, pp. 56-57).  
In both theories, capital formation was encouraged. There was an interest 
in increasing the investment rate to expand the stock of capital and, hence, to 
expand output. From this perspective, input-output analysis became popular and 
capital output ratios were calculated to determine how much was needed to raise 
economic growth by certain margins. Capital aid was frequently sought to make 
up for the non-existent capital stock in the Third World. Also, import 
substitution, industrialisation, and human capital formation (and with it, 
technical assistance, to make up for shortage of skills in the Third World) were 
encouraged (Arndt, 1989, pp.49-87).  
Within this framework of growth, bitter debates and criticisms arose about 
the main drivers and processes.  Indeed, in his book, Dissent on Development, 
Lord Peter Bauer criticised the work of Nurske arguing that it was inconsistent 
with empirical evidence.  He argued that the currently rich countries were once 
poor but had escaped it, some poor countries had made great progress, and there 
was almost no ‘external assistance’ in the journey of the then poor in the process 
of becoming ‘developed’ (Bauer, 1971, pp. 33-34). Others such as Albert 
Hirchman pointed to different drivers of growth, importantly the need for the 
nurturing of entrepreneurial skills in the poorer countries (Martinussen, 2005, p. 
59). To others such as W.W. Rostow (1954) and Sir Arthur Lewis (1954; 1979) 
an entire structural change was required for the Third World to reach where the 
so-called first world had reached.  
Rostow drew mainly on the history of the ‘developed countries’ to argue 
that the Third World would have to go through five stages of growth, starting 
from the traditional society, through the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, 
the drive to maturity, the age of high mass-consumption, to the stage beyond 
consumption. Each of these had a different mix of what requirements were 
needed to attain growth (see Rostow, 1954).  Sir Arthur Lewis, on his side, 
offered one of the most influential theories in development economics on private 
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sector development, employment and economic development. The seminal 
paper for which he was later awarded a Nobel prize looked at ‘economic 
development with unlimited supplies of labor’ in a process, which he famously 
called a ‘dual economy model’ (Lewis, 1954). Lewis argued that economically 
backward countries had two distinct characteristics, namely a bifocal economy - 
one, subsistence, the other capitalist - and unlimited labour.  According to 
Lewis, in the process of economic development, a large subsistence sector (as in 
agriculture) loses ‘surplus labour’ to a relatively small capitalist sector of the 
economy. An expansion in profit for capitalists is, therefore, conducive to 
economic development because capitalists reinvest, what he called, the 
‘capitalist surplus’, thereby driving capital accumulation and, in turn, drawing 
surplus labour from the subsistence sector of the economy into the modern 
sector (Lewis, 1954). However, although attention was given to various drivers 
of change, economic growth was typically the ends sought. That is, economic 
growth was seen as an end in itself, equivalent to economic development. 
From 1965 onwards, economists realised that, although economic growth 
was accelerating in the Third World, sometimes even faster than in the First 
World, problems such as disease, illiteracy, inequality, and poor housing 
remained. In turn, the growth-centred view of economic development started to 
give way to concerns about broader ‘social objectives’ of economic 
development. In particular, there was an emphasis on employment creation, 
redistribution, providing basic needs of the poor and, in general, poverty 
reduction (Arndt, 1989, pp. 92-113). This emphasis represented the first real 
change in the objectives of economic development. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
claimed that aspiring for more ‘social’ ends of economic development was 
entirely new. Arndt (1989, pp. 89-92) points out that achieving social ends was 
one key aspiration when the United Nations was formed in 1945.  
Nevertheless, it was in the 1960s that greater emphasis was given to broad 
social concerns of economic development. Economic development then became 
a process of change to free nations and peoples from multiple deprivations. 
Poverty alleviation or reduction was one key objective. However, Misturell and 
Heffernan’s (2010) synchronic study of the concept of poverty reveals the 
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instability in its meaning within and across time, and across different 
institutions. In the same year, poverty could be defined as absence of basic 
needs, poor access to infrastructure, or both. Poverty could be defined 
politically, socially, economically, physically, metaphysically, or institutionally. 
These differences in definition were not trivial. They largely determined, 
constrained, or restrained what policy options were chosen. Yet, the instability 
in meaning, among others, entailing income-centric and individualistic measures 
and broader measures, persisted through the 1960s, the 1970s, to the early 80s 
when economic growth once again ascended the throne. That was when the 
Breton Woods institutions prescribed growth-centric reform policies for the 
Third World (Misturelli and Heffernan, 2010). Yet, the calamitous effects of 
those policies (Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International 
Network [SAPRIN] (2002) led to widespread discontent with economic growth 
as an end of economic development and, by the 1990s, a pluralist view of 
economic development had firmly gained ground again. The idea that poverty 
had one meaning became unpopular and the view that poverty is a multi-
dimensional and collective concept gained roots. Aspects such as poverty as a 
denial of rights or rights based approaches to development became prominent 
(Misturelli and Heffernan, 2010), with Amartya Sen, Economics Nobel 
Laureate, writing his magnum opus, Development as Freedom (Sen, 1999). 
Indeed,  the pluralist view got an added boost when it became possible to 
quantify progress by calculating the Human Development Index, which is a 
composite measure of health (measured as life expectancy at birth), education 
(measured as the literacy rate), and standard of living (measured as economic 
growth).  
 
3. Economic Development: 2000 -  
At the turn of the millennium, world leaders adopted a 15-year plan to 
attain economic development by achieving 8 different goals, christened the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These are eradication of extreme 
poverty and hunger; attainment of universal primary education; promotion of 
gender equality and empowerment of women; reduction of child mortality; 
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improvement of maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases; ensuring the provision of environmental sustainability; and developing 
global partnership for development. It is these that currently constitute the 
elements of economic development.  
Are the MDGs an effective framework within which to consider Africa’s 
development trajectory? It is an improvement over past mono index 
frameworks. However, there are deep problems with the MDGs too. Take the 
goal of achieving sustainable land management, for example. Attaining secure 
tenure under the MDGs entails providing landowners and slum dwellers formal 
titles to land. Yet, there are many countries in Africa (e.g., Ghana) where the 
provision of title certificates has not brought secure tenure. In fact, there are 
many people in Africa who, without titles, feel that their land tenure is secure 
(Bugri, 2008). Also, in countries such as South Africa, the very notion of 
providing titles to gain secure tenure is secondary to a broader problem of 
unequal distribution of land (Bennett et al., 2013). This latter problem has 
recently been compounded by a phenomenon of land grabbing where the state 
colludes with private capital to dispossess people of their land (see, for example, 
Cotula and Vermeulen, 2011; Chu, 2011). So, the issue of secure tenure is 
conceptually contested and vague (Domeher and Abdulai, 2012).  
Other goals are similarly problematic, at least conceptually. The goal of 
ensuring access to water is a case in point. There are countries where access has 
improved, but cost, distribution, and reliability of water service have worsened 
(Allen and Bell, 2011). Also, goal 1 of halving the share of people living under 
the poverty line says nothing about those people who live under the poverty line. 
The focus is mainly about those who rise above the poverty line, not those 
people below it (Easterly, 2007; 2009).  Furthermore, feminist economists argue 
that the gendered nature of economic development is grossly oversimplified into 
increasing primary school enrolment rate which does not even correlate with 
income and employment disparities in the ‘real world’. By ignoring glaring 
disparities in gender relations, the MDGs have been nicknamed ‘most 
distracting gimmick’ (Francisco and Antrobus, 2009, p.164).  
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There are also problems of data collection, manipulation, and 
extrapolation that misrepresent the state of economic development in African 
countries (Alvarez et al., 2011). Easterly (2007; 2009), for instance, has 
consistently tried to show that the MDGs are biased against Africa. He shows 
that because African countries are starting already from a ‘low base’, the 
calculations of ‘progress’ or ‘regress’ by the UN is likely to tell more positively 
on other countries than those in Africa. Also, although the MDGs were globally 
accepted in 2000, the base year for analysis is 1990. Incidentally, most countries 
in Africa experienced difficult economic circumstances in the 1990s. Therefore, 
the mark of failure was awarded to ‘Africa’ at the very beginning of 
implementing the MDGs and their strategies. Because poverty is usually a 
nonlinear function of per capita income, how quickly it is reduced depends on 
the initial average incomes. It follows that even if African countries grow at the 
same pace with countries in other regions, they would perform worse on 
reducing poverty than richer countries. Thus, most African countries need to 
grow faster than richer countries elsewhere to attain goal one (Easterly, 2007; 
2009).  
Furthermore, there are huge disparities in targets in the MDGs (e.g., 50 
per cent reduction in poverty; 67 per cent reduction in child mortality), arising 
from the fact that the MDGs were formulated on the basis of global historical 
trends, that is, on the basis that universal historical trends would be the same as 
future trends. It follows that the MDGs are only as good as a global, not 
necessarily a country-specific or even regional specific, framework 
(Vandemoortele, 2008). To Rist (2006), the many contradictions in the 
conceptualisation of economic development would suggest that it is more 
appropriate to define that notion with reference to empirical circumstances 
rather than normative ideals. From that perspective, economic development is a 
problem in itself.  
In spite of this complex picture about economic development, both 
‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of Africa all too often make claims about how harsh is 
life in Africa and how bad is everything African on the basis of indicators and 
frameworks of ‘economic development’. A content analysis of the ten most 
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widely read newspapers in the United States of America showed that, from May 
to October 2010, only 5 out of 245 articles published on Africa focused on a 
positive picture of wealth and growth. The rest were about images of death, 
dying, and poverty (Ezekwesili, 2011, p.ix). It is not only journalists who 
represent Africa as such. Eminent scholars who write about Third World 
development are guilty too. For instance, in The Challenge of Third World 
Development, now in its sixth edition, Handelman (2011) attributes ‘failure’ in 
African countries to ‘a tradition of deep government corruption’ (p.50, my 
italics), but when it is about other countries in other regions, he talks of ‘a 
tradition of honest governments’ (p.48, my italics). The so-called friends of 
Africa are equally guilty. During a recent symposium focusing on Africa, one 
attendee suggested that there was something ‘African’ about despotism when he 
asked a section of African ministers of state, ‘why does Africa have such a big 
appetite for despots?’2  
To counter the emphasis on ‘negative Africa’, Africanists have started 
focusing on the success stories in Africa (see, for example, Chuhan-Pole and 
Angwafo, 2011; African Development Bank, 2011). Yet, these stories normally 
use the same conventional indicators that are in contest. Also, they merely 
generate a case of ‘reverse propaganda’ where negative stories replace positive 
ones. Chinua Achebe (1978, p.13) once suggested that the approach is akin to 
offering developed countries, especially Western ones, bribes to make them 
think positively of Africa. Telling positive stories about Africa is important, of 
course, but the practice does not address the bigger problem of the 
appropriateness of some of the socio-economic indicators used to paint a 
negative image of the continent. There is the need for emphasising other 
indicators of progress.  
While there has been considerable work in looking for alternatives, 
culminating in the use of a wide variety of indices such as the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and its variants (e.g., inequality-adjusted HDI) and 
Human Poverty Index, growth centric indices remain firmly entrenched as the 
                                                            
2  The forum was dubbed ‘Building bridges between Africa and Australia’. It was held on the 13th of May, 
2011 at the University of Sydney, Australia The author was in attendance. 
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most widely used measures of progress. Indeed, one of the key inputs for 
computing the HDI is the gross national product (GNP), a refinement after years 
of using gross domestic product (GDP).  However, whether GNP or GDP, the 
economic activities that take place in the massive informal sector in Africa count 
for little or nothing in this measure. The recent rebasing of the Ghanaian 
economy, entailing the inclusion and counting of activities in the services sector 
previously overlooked, led to a whopping 69 per cent increase in the country’s 
GDP and, overnight, Ghana became a lower middle income country; no longer a 
poor country (Moss and Majerowicz, 2010). This experience gives a strong 
indication of how current growth measures misrepresent the true state of 
Africa’s economies.  
Nevertheless, merely expanding growth measures to capture hitherto 
ignored economic activities will not be sufficient. Growth measures can be quite 
autistic. Indeed, while Ghana’s economy was supposedly doing really well by 
the account of the economic managers who were quoting the new, rebased 
growth figures, the people living in Ghana did not experience any change in 
their economic situation (Bawumia, 2012). For the youth, it was mainly a case 
of jobless growth (Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research, 2012, 
pp. 201 – 223). So, the economy was doing ‘well’, but not the people. Further, 
growth measures do not tell us about the quality of the economic activities that 
are measured as growth, including environmental impacts (Stilwell, 1999). More 
fundamentally, they reinforce running African economies in ways in which 
those measures can capture – extending private markets and commodifying 
society.3  
To change track, Williams (2009) has suggested that the rise of African 
majorities to overthrow white supremacist and minority colonial rule could be 
an important index the same way that ‘colonial economic development’ was 
deemed a success. This measure is perceptive, but it will only tell us about the 
                                                            
3  Some orthodox Austrian economists, notably Frank Shostak, are critical of growth measures, but mainly 
because they do not sufficiently capture market activities. In turn, they recommend measures that can help 
to enhance and measure greater commodification of society (see, for example, Shostak, 2001). For a 
discussion of the analytical and empirical problems of this view of globalising the ‘market society’, see The 
Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time by Karl Polanyi, eminent 
economic anthropologist (Polanyi, [1945] 2001), and more recent political economic studies by Spies-
Butcher, Paton, and Cahill (2012). 
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past. Present and future indices are also needed. One of such  alternatives is 
‘happiness’ (e.g., Strack et al., 1991) which has recently been described as 
‘absolute, universal, ultimate’ and the index to replace traditional measures of 
economic development (Yew-Kwang, 2011, p.1, my italics). In turn, several 
questions have been asked of happy people. What makes them happy? Why are 
they happy? What do they do when they are happy? And, most importantly, how 
is happiness measured (Veenhoven, 1991)?  
 
4. Considering one alternative: Happiness 
How much one is satisfied with one’s life, the whole life, is what is 
usually called happiness (Ott, 2010, p.632). Happiness is normally understood to 
be comprised of three elements, namely positive affect, satisfaction in life, and 
the absence of stress (Argyle and Lu, 1990, p.1011). To Aristotle, one of the 
early writers on the subject, ‘Happiness is the meaning and purpose of life, the 
whole aim and end of human existence’ (cited in Hagedorn, 2012, p.490). 
It is an important measure of progress because it tells how satisfied people 
are regardless of where they live, their age, sex, or race. To this end, happiness 
can be used to evaluate a public policy in which case the question will be in 
what ways the policy is contributing to happiness among the targeted 
population; or to make a case for a particular type of policy if it can be 
demonstrated that the said policy will make the people happy  (Schubert, 2012). 
Happy people are friendly to their neighbours and have less stress. They are 
optimistic and look forward to a future of hope and promise. Happiness levels 
change with ill health and bad mood (Myers and Diener, 1995; Hills and Argyle, 
2002) and it is rare for people to fake happiness continuously when they are in 
‘misery’ (Veenhoven, 1991, pp. 13-14). For all these reasons, it is an important 
measure of the quality of life of people.   
Psychologists have shown that there is a strong positive correlation 
between being an extrovert and being happy. The reason is that extroverts 
partake more in social activities, such as being members of clubs and teams, 
parties and dances. Extroverts are also happier because they tend to joke more, 
are assertive, and co-operate more (Lu and Argyle, 1991). Not only does being 
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sociable correlate with happiness, but also it predicts more happiness (Argyle 
and Lu, 1990). General network relationships, network-based information 
channels, and mutually agreed sanctions for breach of community trust are said 
to predict happiness too (Leung et al., 2011). 
Orthodox economists claim that the process of producing happiness can 
be reduced to only four factors, namely present circumstances, past experiences, 
future expectations, and comparison with others (Frey and Stutzer, 2002, p.405). 
However, psychologists contend that the issues are more complex, involving 
debates about whether happiness is a product of emotions or thinking, whether 
people are born with happiness traits, or whether happiness is mainly dependent 
on the satisfaction of needs or comparison with others (Veenhoven, 1991, pp.14-
15). More recent studies (e.g, Veenhoven, 2011, pp.11-12) have shed some light 
on these issues. First, there is a variation in the levels of happiness of different 
people over time. So, trait is important but happiness is not all about trait. 
Comparison too is important but so are absolute measures.  
The measurement of happiness can be done ‘subjectively’ or 
‘objectively’. Establishing subjective wellbeing, or measuring happiness 
subjectively, entails interviews with people using different questions about how 
satisfied they are with life. The Oxford Happiness Questionnaire and the Oxford 
Happiness Inventory are widely used tools for collecting information about 
people’s self-reported happiness (Hills and Argyle, 2002) and the World 
Database of Happiness is a one-stop shop for papers on the subject (see 
Veenhoven, 1994 for an overview). 
There are also objective measures. Such criteria are proxies to determine 
whether individuals are happy. Specific questions include whether personal 
needs have been met. There are also reflections on creativeness and self-
actualisation, suicide rates and so on. These proxies constitute what economists 
call ‘revealed preference’. To economists, subjective measures are unscientific, 
so objective measures are preferable (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). However, 
psychologists, who pioneered the study of happiness, have shown that there is a 
general consensus that people’s life satisfaction cannot be assessed using proxy 
indicators. It is better to seek people’s subjective well-being (Veenhoven, 1991, 
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pp.9-12). This approach corresponds with the ancient Aristotelian wisdom that 
‘[w]e must therefore survey what we have already said, bring it to the test of the 
facts of life, and if it harmonises with the facts we must accept it, but if it 
clashes with them we must suppose it to be mere theory’ (cited in Helliwell, 
2003, p. 332-333). 
On this basis, can it be said that Africans are happy? Table 1 is revealing. 
It contains data on the subjective responses of people in different countries 
across the world to the question whether they have a purposeful life. The top 20 
performers in a league containing the US, UK, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, 
and Australia are African countries. Liberians are the happiest people on earth, 
by that measure. People in materially poor countries such as Sierra Leone were 
happier than the populations of resource rich countries such as the United States 
(49th), the UK (116th), and Norway (100th).  
 
Ranking on the Basis of 
population 
Living a purposeful life 
Country % of people who agreed that they 
have a purposeful life 
Negative Experience Index 
(0, most negative; 100 least 
negative) 
1 Liberia 100 27 
1 Venezuela 100 19 
3 Togo 99 21 
3 Malawi 99 14 
3 Mali 99 13 
3 Niger 99 14 
3 Namibia 98 16 
3 Kenya 98 19 
3 Ghana 98 22 
3 Cote d'Ivoire 98 16 
3 Sierra Leone 98 37 
3 Congo 98 23 
3 Panama 98 15 
3 Ecuador 98 27 
3 Colombia 98 25 
3 Jamaica 98 18 
3 Viet Nam 98 17 
3 Nicaragua 98 28 
3 Lao 98 N/A 
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…continued 
20 Sudan 97 28 
28 Benin 96 24 
 28 Madagascar 96 19 
28 Uganda 96 31 
28 Guinea 96 26 
28 Central African Republic 96 28 
28 Peru 96 28 
49 USA 94 28 
82 Denmark 89 15 
90 Australia 87 22 
90 New Zealand 87 24 
100 Norway 85 16 
100 Sweden 85 16 
100 Germany 85 22 
116 UK 79 24 
124 Netherlands 70 16 
134 Hong Kong 60 26 
Table 1: Ranking of Countries on the basis of happiness 
Source: UNDP, 2010, pp. 176-179 
 
True, caution is needed in analysing the data in table 1 because there is 
some debate about whether having a purposeful life is analogous with being 
happy. However, existing evidence shows that the two are not substantially 
different and can be treated as synonymous (Easterlin, 2004). Future research 
can employ the use of ethnographic interviewing to further probe these results 
but, for now, with no contrary evidence, the question should be what makes 
people happy and what does not?  
There is formidable evidence that values such as kindness, sharing, 
togetherness, good health, self-respect, enjoyable work, singing, marriage, love 
and other collective ethos make people happy. Values such as competition, 
selfishness, greed, individualism – the famous homo economicus ethos highly 
praised by orthodox economists - typically make people grievous and are 
inconsistent with religious beliefs about love and collectivity (Leung et al., 
2010; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Ramos, 2012). Indeed, one survey of economics 
PhD students showed that the ethos of economic science is inconsistent with the 
Christian faith about generosity and kindness (Chalupníček, 2011). 
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Earning more income - which has ringing endorsement in orthodox 
economics theories - is important but, as demonstrated in the well-known 
Easterlin Paradox, only to a point. That is, after a certain basic increase in per 
capita income, further increases make no difference to levels of happiness 
(Easterlin et al., 2011). But even beyond that, the insatiable drive for profit, 
profit, and profit can actually cause stress or, what in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments; Adam Smith called the parable of the poor man’s son. Greatly 
desirous of the comforts of the rich, the poor man’s son puts in great effort to be 
like the rich (Peach, 2010, p.407). Year by year trying everything possible and 
only eventually realising that he has denied himself of the pleasures associated 
with his body and mind conditions in those years of exertion than he would ever 
have done from the want of those pleasures (Peach, 2010, p.407). “‘The deluded 
young man’, the parable goes, ‘is ambitious, admires the condition of the rich, 
and imagines that great riches will bring him correspondingly great happiness’, 
so he ‘devotes himself for ever to the pursuit of wealth and greatness’. In the 
process, ‘he submits in the first year, nay in the first month of his application, to 
more fatigue of body and more uneasiness of mind than he could have suffered 
through the whole of his life from the want of them”  (Peach, 2010, p.407). At 
old age, the once youngman realises the folly of pursuing too great wealth 
(Peach, 2010, p.407). Being with the Joneses itself creates a dis-ease of 
frustration, chronic stress, indebtedness, waste in society, and an endless 
marathon for plenty - symptoms collectively diagnosed as ‘affluenza’ by 
Australian political economists Clive Hamilton and Richard Denniss (2005). 
Further, when individual incomes increase at the expense of or relative to 
broader societal incomes, there is great tension, fear, and panic, especially for 
those who hold the disproportionate share of income in society. In turn, gated 
and guarded communities arise in which the rich and well-to-do retreat for 
protection often from non-existent crime – a phenomenon sociologist Runciman 
(1972) referred to as relative deprivation and recently empirically verified 
(Obeng-Odoom et al., 2013). These findings, based on both life-cycle and point-
in-time studies, flatly reject the economic theory of happiness: more money 
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makes you happy, eloquently explained in The Happy Economist (Gittins, 2010) 
or, more recently, in the work of Stevenson and Wolfers (2013).  
More fundamentally, these findings raise questions about what is meant 
by Africa’s need for ‘economic development’. It behoves the region to 
champion a new way of seeing its development that tries to prioritise the ethos, 
values, and ends that make people happy, such as providing quality healthcare 
and improving the life experiences of people with different abilities or so-called 
disabled people; and support and improvement of communal and decentred 
forms of organisation and governance in which the youth, for instance, can hold 
their leaders to account and in which Africans can live harmoniously with the 
environment (Maathai, 2012). Further, there can be greater support for families 
and mothers, including support for child care. If money is also important, but to 
some level, then perhaps African leaders may consider committing themselves 
to an amount of country-specific income floor for everyone regardless of 
whether they are employed. Progressive regulations collectively decided and 
strictly enforced to tax away unearned income, for example, concentrated in the 
hands of landowners, can also be considered. 
In practice, rather than ‘think and act for themselves, and learn from their 
mistakes’, to use the words of Wangari Maathai, African Nobel Laureate 
(Maathai, 2012, p. 7), past efforts at Africa’s development – be it national, 
regional, or continental, have mostly been modelled after global ideas of the 
ends of development. Unification (e.g., combining Africa’s markets through 
regional blocs such as New Partnership for Africa’s Development) and import 
substitution industrialisation, structural adjustment programmes, indigenisation, 
and villagisation while different strategies and tried at different times, have all 
been aimed at achieving similar changing ends of development. ‘Alternative 
strategies’ provided by the UN-Economic Commission for Africa and the 
African Development Bank Group have mostly been aimed at similar ends too.  
Indeed, the current issue of the African Development Bank Group’s 
Economic Outlook 2013 report (African Development Bank et al., 2013) 
understands ‘economic development’ mainly in growth terms. To be sure, there 
are many who, regardless of the numerous weaknesses of the measures of 
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economic growth – e.g., failure to take into account the work of women and the 
vast number of people in the informal sector in Africa, the disconnect between 
growth and happiness, the neglect of environmental problems in the measures of 
growth, and lack of attention to inequality - argue the case for giving more 
priority to achieving more growth, as we see in Why Africa Fails: the Case for 
growth before democracy (Twineyo-Kamugisha, 2012).  
Some of these aspirations are the result of mimicry of the West, or put 
more positively, an attempt to show – as was the case of Nkrumah’s 
modernisation efforts – that the Blackman can pursue the same modernisation 
and growth ends to which the coloniser aspired. At other times, some of the 
terms have been forced down the throats of African leaders as was the case with 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes (Cooper, 2002, pp. 93-118). Indeed, it 
has been argued (e.g., Bierschenk and Spies, 2010) that since the onset of the 
development project, Africa has received more external ‘advice’ than any other 
continent. Further, most of the development advice invariably leads to greater 
secularisation and commodification of African society.  
While a large number of African leaders have worked in cahoots with 
global forces in pursuing what can be called ‘development as commodification’, 
some of the strategies proposed by Africans themselves have been quite radical. 
One example is  limiting economic integration with the ‘developed’ Western 
countries on the basis that contacts with such countries have led to the 
‘development of underdevelopment’ and, in turn, promoting strategies of 
regional integration and self-reliance. Such were the ideas that were 
encapsulated in the Lagos Plan of Action for the Development of Africa, 1980  - 
2000 published by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), currently African 
Union, (OAU, 1979), that drew intellectual inspiration from dependency 
theorists in Africa (e.g., Amin, 1972; 2002) and Latin America (e.g., Frank, 
1966).  
These are radical perspectives because contrary to the widely held view 
that the ‘developed’ and ‘developing Africa’ are unrelated or are travelling on a 
different path, and the whole development project is supposed to make Africa 
resemble the developed North, they posit that those trying to ‘help’ Africa to 
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develop are, in fact, occupying their position of wealth and prestige mainly 
because Africa is ‘poor’ (Rodney, 1972; Southall and Melber, 2009; Kindiki, 
2011). Dependency ideas of development question the universalising notion of 
globalisation and world integration. However, put under close watch, we see that 
they aspire to similar global ends of development (mainly economic growth), 
albeit via a different path and way of thinking. 
 Regardless, as we see from the work of Owusu (2003), these brave ideas 
have hardly been entertained, let alone fully implemented.  Such neocolonial 
impediments continue to this day. Neoliberal and imperial apparachiks continue 
to thwart efforts of thinking about development in a different way, while giving 
resounding support to different shades of development measures, meanings, and 
processes, selectively, chosen to open up, extend, and deepen existing private 
markets in Africa ultimately for the benefit of powerful and wealthy classes 
without, within, and around Africa. 
 
5. Conclusion  
So, is something wrong with economic development in Africa? 
 
‘Silence!’ the King called out and read out from his book, ‘Rule Forty-two: All 
persons more than a mile high to leave the court.’ Everybody looked at Alice. 
‘I’m not a mile high’, said Alice. ‘You are’, said the King. ‘Nearly two miles 
high’, added the Queen. ‘Well, I sha’n’t go, at any rate’, said Alice: ‘besides, 
that’s not a regular rule: you invented it just now’. ‘It’s the oldest rule in the 
book’, said the King. ‘Then it ought to be Number one’, said Alice. The King 
turned pale, and shut his note-book hastily’ (Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, 
cited in Lund, 1998, p.1). 
 
Such selectivity rings true for many an analysis of the state of economic 
development in Africa. ‘Africa is a failure’ is a common discourse. One reason 
for this misrepresentation is ignorance - ignorance about the diversity in Africa: 
that Africa is not a country but a continent; ignorance about the political 
economy of economic indicators, and ignorance about history –, but ignorance is 
only part of the picture. Ideology and hence the privileging of certain indicators 
constitute yet another motive, while prejudice is a third reason. 
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Regardless of the reasons, whether Africa is doing well or badly depends 
on which indicators are used for analysis. Economic development is nothing and 
everything. Its meanings and objects evolve and are often contested. It means 
different things at different times. On some of its objectives, African countries 
are doing well, but on others they are not doing so well. On many more, African 
countries differ in their ranking. So, just as people do not make sweeping 
generalisations about the Americas based on selective evidence or simplistic 
generalisations about Europe based on indicators parochially chosen about 
Belarus, for example, it is misleading to depict ‘Africa’ as a hopeless continent 
on the basis of selecting narrow indicators and evidence from a few countries on 
the continent. 
The one thing that is clear whatever indicator is chosen is that, across 
Africa – North, South, West, and East, Central, Madagascar, and the small 
island states - the African people themselves have made an emphatic statement: 
they live a purposeful and happy life. The implication is this. The continent and 
its leaders ought to focus less on pecuniary, secular measures of progress, and 
do more in terms of what enhances their people’s happiness. 
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